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Johnson v. Bodine Electric Co.'
I. INTRODUCTION
With the recent explosion of employment discrimination litigation has come an
increase in the desirability of arbitration to resolve them. The inclusion of
mandatory arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements would appear to
close the door to the courthouse for unionized workers claiming job discrimination.
Federal courts, however, have seen things differently.
This casenote addresses the effect of mandatory arbitration provisions in
collective bargaining agreements ("CBA") upon statutory anti-discrimination claims.
Disputes in this area arise when an employee joins a union, thus becoming subject
to a CBA negotiated between the union and the employees. What often happens is
that the CBA will generally contain a clause calling for arbitration of all claims
arising under the agreement. Later, if the employee believes he has been subjected
to discriminatory practices on the part of the employer and seeks remedies under
anti-discrimination laws, such as Title VII, the employer will move to compel
arbitration. The issue in such cases is whether an employee loses the right to pursue
a judicial remedy by joining a union governed by a CBA.
The United States Supreme Court has twice addressed the enforceability of
agreements to arbitrate employment discrimination claims and the cases are at odds
with each other.' By distinguishing these two cases, the Court is able to retain both
opinions as good law, but in the process, much confusion has been created for lower
federal courts, practitioners, employers and employees. Federal case law in this area
is encompassed by two distinct views. The minority view asserts that arbitration of
statutory claims is required under the CBA. The vast majority of courts, by contrast,
hold that an employee in the situation described above is not required to arbitrate
statutory discrimination claims. The majority view recognizes the protection that is
1. 142 F.3d 363 (7th Cir. 1998).
2. Compare Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), with Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
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needed for unionized workers and the inherent conflict between arbitration under a
CBA and employment discrimination rights. This view, which allows an employee
to pursue judicial remedies for statutory claims, necessarily leads to more of these
claims being filed in courts, not with arbitrators. While this result seems inconsistent
with the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration, it correctly balances the interests
at stake. While arbitration is more efficient and cost-effective, these goals are
outweighed by the need to protect employees' rights under employment
discrimination statutes.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
When Cleotis Johnson ("Johnson") moved to Illinois, he joined the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers ("IBEW") Local 601, where he was classified as
an out-of-town union member. This status meant that local union members would
receive preference for jobs before Johnson, and Johnson would be subject to lay-offs
before the other members.4 Membership for one year was required in order to
achieve local member status.' Johnson secured work with Bodine Electric Co.
("Bodine") through Local 601.6 Johnson claimed he was subjected to a "racially
discriminatory hostile work environment" while working for Bodine, eventually
leading to being laid-off from that job, one month before achieving local member
status.7
Johnson's employment with Bodine was covered by a CBA.' The CBA was
entered into between Local 601 and the local chapter of the National Electrical
Contractor's Association (NECA), of which Bodine is a member.9 A grievance
provision of the CBA provided for arbitration of disputes. 10
Johnson filed suit against Bodine under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, bypassing the grievance procedure in the CBA." Johnson alleged that he was
subjected to discrimination on the job and laid off because of his race. 2 The United
States District Court for the Central District of Illinois dismissed Johnson's suit for






9. Id. at 365.
10. Id. The grievance provisions states that:
All grievances or questions in dispute shall be adjusted by the duly authorized
representatives of each of the parties to this Agreement. In the event that these two are
unable to adjust any matter within 48 hours, they shall refer the same to the Labor-
Management Committee. The Labor-Management Committee, a six member creation of
the CBA, is composed of three union representatives and three management
representatives. The Committee decides issues by majority vote. If the Committee fails
"to agree or to adjust any matter, such shall then be referred to the Council on Industrial
Relations (CIR) for the Electrical Contracting Industry for adjudication."
Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 364.
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lack of subject matter jurisdiction, stating that, "Johnson had not exhausted the
grievance procedures mandated by the collective bargaining agreement between
Local 601 and Bodine."'
' 3
Johnson appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit. 4 The appellate court held that Johnson was not compelled to
arbitrate his Title VII claim, despite the presence of the arbitration provision in the.
CBA.1 5 Although Johnson's claim partially addressed the lay-off procedures
contained in the CBA, the majority of his claim was founded upon federal statutory
rights, specifically his rights under Title VII.16 When an employee joins a union and
becomes a party to a CBA with a mandatory arbitration clause, he will not be forced
to arbitrate discrimination claims under Title VII. An employee is only required to
arbitrate those disputes that he specifically contracts to arbitrate.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The issue of the effect of mandatory arbitration clauses in collective bargaining
agreements upon an employee's claim of discrimination has been frequently litigated
in the federal courts. Although the issue is not fully settled, a look at the progeny of
cases resulting from the United States Supreme Court decision in Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co.'7 is useful in determining the future path of the law in this
particular area.
In Alexander, the plaintiff was an African-American man who alleged violation
of Title VII.' 8 Pursuant to a CBA, he submitted his claims to an arbitrator, who ruled
against him. He then sued in federal court under Title VII, and his former employer
sought to dismiss the suit based on the previous arbitration proceeding. The district
and appellate court ruled for the employer, holding that Alexander was bound by the
arbitrator's decision. The United States Supreme Court reversed. First, the Supreme
Court found that where a CBA contains language providing for nondiscrimination
by the employer similar to Title VII, an employee has two separate remedies for the
alleged discrimination, the CBA and Title VII.'9 The court's reasoning was based
upon the distinct and separate nature of the two rights being protected: contractual
and statutory. 20 Next, the court noted that arbitration is inferior to the judicial
process in protecting and adjudicating Title VII rights.2' Several reasons were
articulated for this part of the holding, including: the specialized competence of
arbitrators in the internal laws of the workplace and not the external laws of society,
the superior fact-finding process that occurs in the courtroom, the lack of a complete
record in arbitration, the lack of rules of evidence in arbitration, and aspects of civil
13. Id.
14. Id. at 365.
15. Id. at 367.
16. Id. at 366.
17. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
18. Id. at 38-39.
19. Id. at 52.
20. Id. at 50.
21. Id. at 56.
1999]
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trials not present or limited in arbitration, such as discovery, compulsory process,
cross-examination, and testimony under oath." Finally, the court stated that the
mandatory arbitration clause could not constitute a waiver of judicial remedies.
The state of the law after Alexander was that an employee could pursue both
arbitration and judicial remedies for employment discrimination claims. This state
of affairs continued until the court decided Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.'
The Court's decision in Gilmer caused great confusion in this area of the law. In
Gilmer, the Court rejected most of the reasoning which underlay Alexander, but did
not expressly overrule it. Instead, the Court created a clever distinction.
In Gilmer, the plaintiff was a securities salesman, and he was required to register
with several securities exchanges, including the New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE").24 The NYSE had a mandatory arbitration clause.25 Gilmer was fired and
subsequently brought suit in federal court under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA").26 The district court ruled for Gilmer, finding that he
did not need to arbitrate his discrimination claim, resting its decision on Alexander.
The court of appeals reversed and the United States Supreme Court upheld the
appellate court's ruling.
The court noted that mistrust of arbitration procedures and recognition of its
inferiority, which are evident in the Alexander opinion, should be reconsidered. The
court stated that, "[a]lthough those procedures [in arbitration] might not be as
extensive as in the federal courts, by agreeing to arbitrate, a party 'trades the
procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity,
informality, and expedition of arbitration."' 27 Thus, the court held that Gilmer was
required to arbitrate his statutory rights under the ADEA.
The Supreme Court attempted to distinguish Gilmer from Alexander in three
ways. First, the Gilmer court stated that Alexander did not address the effect of
mandatory arbitration clauses on statutory claims, but, rather, whether arbitration of
contract-based claims precluded subsequent judicial resolution of statutory claims.28
Second, the Gilmer court found that in Alexander, the employee was represented by
his union in the arbitration proceeding, thus presenting a conflict between individual
and collective representation.2 9  This conflict was not present in the later case
because Gilmer represented himself. Third, the Gilmer court distinguished the two
cases on the basis of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), which was applicable in
Gilmer, but not in Alexander.3" The FAA evidences a liberal federal policy favoring
22. Id. at 57-58.
23. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
24. Id. at 23. The registration application required Gilmer "to arbitrate any dispute, claim or
controversy arising between him and [his employer] that is required to be arbitrated under the rules,
constitutions, or bylaws of the organizations with which [he] register[ed]." Id.
25. Id. The NYSE required the "arbitration of any controversy between a registered representative
and any... member organization arising out of the employment or termination of employment of such
registered representative." Id.
26. Id. at 23-24.
27. Id. at 31.
28. Id. at 35.
29. Id.
30. Id.
[Vol. 1999, No. I
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arbitration agreements, thus leading to the decision to uphold the arbitration of
Gilmer's claim."
Since Gilmer, seven circuits have addressed the question of whether a CBA can
compel an employee to arbitrate his claims under federal anti-discrimination statutes
and these seven circuits have had to determine how to reconcile Alexander and
Gilmer. The majority of circuits have held that mandatory arbitration clauses in a
CBA are not applicable to statutory claims such as those under anti-discrimination
laws. Siding with the majority are the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits. 2 The Fourth Circuit has clearly sided with the minority and upheld the
arbitration of these statutory claims.33 The Third Circuit originally followed the
Fourth, but that opinion was later withdrawn, and it is unclear whether it sides with
the majority or minority.34
The Eighth Circuit discussed this issue in Varner v. National Super Markets,
Inc. 35 In this case, the plaintiff sued her employer in federal district court for
violations of Title VII and a state civil rights statute. The plaintiff was successful at
the district court level and the employer appealed, claiming that the plaintiff had
failed to pursue her arbitration remedy under a CBA before bringing suit in court.
3 6
Citing Alexander, the court of appeals ruled that the employee was not barred from
bringing a judicial action to resolve her Title VII claim.37
The Seventh Circuit found the arbitrability issue before it in Pyner v. Tractor
Supply Co. 3' First, the court noted that judicial remedies may be available when an
employee first pursues arbitration and his statutory remedies are not fully vindicated
in that founm. 39 Next, the Seventh Circuit expressed concern over the ability of the
union to institute the grievance procedures under a CBA, but not giving employees
the same right. An employee cannot have confidence as to whether his claim will
even be pursued in arbitration because unions exercise a great amount of discretion
over whether to bring a grievance and because a court, when reviewing this
discretion, is required to lend deference to the union's decision.40 The court also
discussed the conflict between majority and minority rights. Majority rights are
recognized in the CBA, which is approved by a majority of workers. Minority
31. Id.
32. See Penny v. United Parcel Serv., 128 F.3d 408 (6th Cir. 1997); Brisentine v. Stone & Webster
Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519 (11 th Cir. 1997); Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir.
1997), vacated, 158 F.3d 1371 (10th Cir. 1998); Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir.
1997); Varner v. National Supermarkets, Inc., 94 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1996).
33. See Brown v. Trans World Airlines, 127 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 1997); Austin v. Owens-Brockway
Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996).
34. See Martin v. Dana Corp., No. 96-1746, 1997 WL 313054, at *8-9 (3d Cir. June 12, 1997),
reversed, 135 F.3d 765 (3d Cir. 1997).
35. 94 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1996).
36. Id. at 1213.
37. Id
38. 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997).
39. Id. at 361. The [employers] concede that to the extent that the rights conferred by the collective
bargaining agreements, or the sanctions available to the arbitrators, fall short of fully vindicating the
plaintiffs' substantive and remedial statutory rights, the plaintiffs will be free to resume their suits after
the arbitrators render their awards, having filed the suits within the statute of limitations. Id.
40. Id. at 362.
1999]
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rights, however, are protected by anti-discriminatory statutes such as Title VII. The
court stated:
We may assume that the union will not engage in actionable
discrimination against minority workers. But we may not assume that it
will be highly sensitive to their special interests, which are interests
protected by Title VII and the other discrimination statutes and will seek
to vindicate those interests with maximum vigor.4
Finally, the Pryner court summed up its ruling by stating that "[a]ll we are holding
is that the union cannot consent for the employee by signing a collective bargaining
agreement that consigns the enforcement of statutory rights to the union-controlled
grievance and arbitration machinery created by the agreement.
4 2
In Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc.,43 the Tenth Circuit ruled that the federal
district court had jurisdiction over the plaintiff s Title VII sexual harassment claim,
notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff failed to pursue her remedies under the
mandatory grievance procedure in a CBA." In arriving at its decision, the court first
noted the distinction, recognized in Alexander, between statutory and contractual
rights.45 Second, the court found that Gilmer is distinguishable from the present
case. In Gilmer, the FAA was controlling, but the Tenth Circuit has ruled that the
FAA does not apply to collective bargaining agreements."
The Eleventh Circuit looked into this issue in Brisentine v. Stone & Webster
Engineering Corp.47 and ruled that an alleged violation of the Americans With
Disabilities Act ("ADA") could be litigated regardless of a mandatory arbitration
clause in a CBA. In summary, the court found that a mandatory arbitration clause
does not bar litigation of a statutory claim, unless three requirements are met." First,
the employee must individually agree to waive this right.49 Second, the agreement
must give the arbitrator specific authority to resolve federal statutory claims.
Finally, the CBA must give the employee the right to institute arbitration procedures
if his or her federal statutory claim is not resolved satisfactorily in the grievance
procedure.5
Presented with a different factual situation than any of the above cases was the
Sixth Circuit in Penny v. United Parcel Service.12 The arbitration clause in this case
specifically referred to rights protected by the ADA, the federal statute under which
the plaintiff was suing. Thus, although the arbitrator could have resolved the ADA
statutory rights of the plaintiff, the Sixth Circuit ruled that the plaintiff was entitled
41. Id. at 362-63.
42. Id. at 363.
43. 112 F.3d. 1437 (10th Cir. 1997), vacated, 158 F.3d 1371 (10th Cir. 1998).
44. Id. at 1453.
45. Id. at 1454.
46. Id.
47. 117 F.3d 519 (11 th Cir. 1997).
48. Id. at 526.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 527.
51. Id.
52. 128 F.3d 408 (6th Cir. 1997).
[Vol. 1999, No. I
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to bring suit in federal court despite the CBA provision. The reason for this ruling,
articulated by the court, was that the grievance procedure was solely available after
invocation by the employer or union, but was not available at the insistence of the
employee.53 For the Sixth Circuit, the importance of an employee being able to
compel arbitration was the controlling factor in determining whether the mandatory
arbitration provision of the CBA barred judicial suits of employment discrimination.
claims.
Only two circuits have ruled that the mandatory arbitration provisions of the
CBA require employees to arbitrate their discrimination claims. In Martin v. Dana
Corp., the Third Circuit ruled that arbitration of a Title VII discrimination claim
under a CBA was proper because the CBA in this case expressly included statutory
claims and granted individual employees the opportunity to compel arbitration.4
However, this opinion was later withdrawn and vacated. The state of the law in the
Third Circuit is, therefore unclear, but it appears as if an employee will not be
compelled to arbitrate employment discrimination claims due to a mandatory
arbitration provision in the CBA.
In 1996, the Fourth Circuit ruled in Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container,
Inc.55 that Gilmer effectively overruled Alexander. The plaintiff sued her employer
for violations of Title VII and the ADA, failing to invoke the mandatory arbitration
clause in the CBA. The majority opinion ruled that:
[w]hether the dispute arises under a contract of employment growing out
of securities registration application, a simple employment contract, or
a collective bargaining agreement, an agreement has yet been made to
arbitrate the dispute. So long as the agreement is voluntary, it is valid,
and we are of opinion it should be enforced.56
In advancing its opinion that Gilmer overruled Alexander, the Fourth Circuit gave
three reasons for its conclusion. First, Gilmer states that an employee is not
foregoing the substantive rights available to her when she arbitrates; she is merely
submitting them to an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.57 This is in direct
contradiction to the holding in Alexander that Title VII claims should not be decided
in an arbitral forum." Second, the Fourth Circuit argued that the passage of the
ADA and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and their legislative histories supports the
view that an agreement to arbitrate will be enforced unless there is an indication of
congressional intent to preclude the waiver of a judicial forum. 9 The court found
no such preclusion or congressional intent in their inquiry. Finally, the court argued
53. Id. at 412.
54. No. 96-1746,1997 WL 313054, at *8-9 (3d Cir. June 12, 1997), reversed, 135 F.3d 765 (3d Cir.
1997).
55. 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996).
56. Id. at 885.
57. Id. at 880.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 880-81.
1999]
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that the post-Gilmer case law supported the conclusion reached by the Fourth
Circuit.
60
Because Austin is the only case that compels arbitration of employment
discrimination claims under a CBA's mandatory arbitration provision, much
criticism has been levied against it. "The Fourth Circuit's approach to the issue
misinterprets the law as set forth by the Supreme Court and demonstrates a lack of
understanding of the operation of the grievance and arbitration procedure in the
collective bargaining context.",6' First and foremost, the Fourth Circuit rules, in
effect, that Gilmer overrules Alexander, but this is a proposition that the United
States Supreme Court, in its Gilmer opinion, refused to consider. The Supreme
Court has said: "If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet
appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the court of
appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the
prerogative of overruling its own decisions." 62 The next criticism focuses on the
opinion's reliance upon congressional intent in the ADA and Civil Rights Act of
1991 ("the Act"). The Fourth Circuit delves into the congressional intent of the
legislators who worked and voted on the Act, and concludes that there is a
preference for arbitration evidenced in it. However, it is not important whether
Congress preferred arbitration over adjudication, but rather whether it meant to
preclude a waiver of the judicial remedy in the Act.63 In looking at intent, a
provision of the legislative history of the Act is "encouraging the use of alternative
means of dispute resolution to supplement, rather than supplant, the rights and
remedies provided by Title VII.' ' Finally, the Fourth Circuit cites a number of post-
Gilmer decisions that support its conclusion. 65 However, none of the cases it cites
involve collective bargaining agreements, but rather cases where employees made
agreements to arbitrate with their employers." Individual agreements were not the
issue presented to the court in Austin, thus the conclusion that their decision is
buttressed by other opinions is simply without merit.
67
The Fourth Circuit reaffirmed its ruling in Austin with Brown v. Trans World
Airlines, but found that an employee was not required to arbitrate a sexual
harassment claim under Title VII.6' The Fourth Circuit's "decision vividly illustrates
the critical significance of the language used in arbitration clauses. ' '69 The court
found that the arbitration clause was not broad enough to include statutory claims,
60. Id. at 882.
61. Ann C. Hodges, Protecting Unionized Employees Against Discrimination: The Fourth Circuit's
Misinterpretation of Supreme Court Precedent, 2 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMPLOYMENT POL'Y J. 123, 124
(1998).
62. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).
63. Harvey R. Boiler & Donald J. Petersen, Job Discrimination Claims Under Collective Bargaining,
DISP. RESOL. J., Aug. 1998, at 45.
64. Id. at 46.
65. Id. at 47.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 127 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 1997).
69. Boiler & Petersen, supra note 63, at 47.
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like Title VII.7° The employee was thus allowed to pursue judicial remedies for the
sexual harassment claims. The Fourth Circuit went on to state that parties are free
to agree to arbitrate all disputes out of the employment relationship, including
statutory and contractual rights, without needing to include a specific statute, such
as Title VII, ADEA, or ADA.7' The differences between Austin and Brown were
pointed out in this opinion. Where the arbitration clause in Austin was broad enough.
to cover statutory claims, the employee was made to arbitrate. In Brown, when the
union tried to draft a narrow arbitration clause and failed to include Title VII
statutory claims, the employee was allowed to pursue judicial remedies. The court
noted in Brown that "the agreement does not purport to submit any noncontract-
based dispute or any statutory dispute to arbitration. In this regard, the language in
the agreement before us is significantly narrower than the language construed in
* . .Austin. 72 Although reaching different conclusions in the two cases, the Fourth
Circuit still adheres to the minority rule. Where the mandatory arbitration clause is
broad and covers all disputes arising out of the employment relationship, an
employee must arbitrate statutory claims.
The Fourth Circuit's interpretation of this area of the law has been reviewed by
the United States Supreme Court. The high Court granted certiorari in Wright v.
Universal Maritime Service Corp.7" In Wright, the Fourth Circuit followed its
opinion in Austin and found that "collective bargaining agreements to arbitrate
employment disputes are binding upon individual employees even when the dispute
involves a federal cause of action. 74 The court found the arbitration clause to be
particularly broad, but Wright argued that since the ADA was not specifically
mentioned in the agreement, he could not be made to arbitrate these claims. 7' The
court rejected that argument stating, "[a]n employer need not provide a laundry list
of potential disputes in order for them to be covered by an arbitration clause., 76 The
Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Wright's suit for failure to pursue his
remedies under the CBA. On October 7, 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral
arguments in this case and rendered a decision on November 16, 1998. The
Supreme Court recognized the tension between Gilmer and Alexander." On the one
hand, Alexander and Gilmer can be read together to hold "that federal forum rights
cannot be waived in union-negotiated CBAs even if they can be waived in
individually executed contracts - a distinction that assuredly finds support in the text
of Gilmer.78 In contrast, the two lines of authority can be read as an evolution in the
judiciary's acceptance of increased use of arbitration, leading to a union being able
to waive an employee's right to his day in court.7 9 While recognizing tension in the
70. Brown, 127 F.3d at 341-342. The arbitration clause contained a prohibition against discrimination
"on account of race, color, creed, religion, sex (sexual harassment), age, handicap, national origin, or
veteran status." Id. at 341.
71. Id. at 341-42.
72. Id. at 341.
73. 118 S.Ct. 1162 (1998).
74. No. 96-2850, 1997 WL 422869, at *2 (4th Cir. July 29, 1997), vacated, 119 S.Ct. 391 (1998).
75. Id.
76. Id.
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precedent, the Court did nothing to break that tension. "[W]e find it unnecessary to
resolve the question of the validity of a union-negotiated waiver, since it is apparent
to us, on the facts and arguments presented here, that no such waiver occurred."'
The waiver "must be clear and unmistakable."'" The Court noted that it was unsure
if Alexander's prohibition against waiver of a federal forum survives Gilmer.'2
However, Alexander "at least stands for the proposition that the right to a federal
judicial forum is of sufficient importance to be protected against less than explicit
union waiver in a CBA." 3 The Court held that the CBA here did not contain a clear
and unmistakable waiver of the employee's right to sue in court for federal
employment discrimination."
It is with this background of cases that the Seventh Circuit was presented with
Johnson v. Bodine Electric Co. Although the decision in Johnson goes along with
the opinion expressed by the majority of circuits, it gives a slightly different
interpretation of the requirements needed to compel arbitration of employment
discrimination claims under CBAs.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Johnson,"5 the Seventh Circuit relied heavily upon its earlier decision in
Pryner" in determining the outcome of the case. Both of these cases addressed the
question of whether a "CBA could compel employees to arbitrate their claims under
federal employment discrimination laws, such as Title VII." 7
The court first considered the role of the CBA in the area of employment and
workers' rights. The CBA is negotiated by a union, adopted by a majority of its
workers, and binding upon all members."8 The court noted that federal anti-
discriminatory statutory rights are bestowed upon minority group members due to
a storied history of discrimination.8 9 The court stated that "[t]he employers' position
delivers the enforcement of the rights of these minorities into the hands of the
majority, and we do not think that this result is consistent with the policy of these
statutes."'9° Thus, the court reasoned that a union cannot enter into a CBA and
thereby agree, on behalf of all employees, to arbitrate statutory rights. 9'
Next, the Seventh Circuit considered whether its decision in Pryner was
distinguishable from the facts and issues presented in the instant case. Bodine
attempted to argue that in Pryner a worker was not allowed to raise a grievance on
his own; rather, the worker had to submit his complaint to the union, who then had
80. Id.
81. Id. at 396.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 397.
85. 142 F.3d 363 (7th Cir. 1998).
86. Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997).
87. Johnson, 142 F.3d at 365.
88. Id. (citing Pryner, 109 F.3d at 362-63).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. (citing Pryner, 109 F.3d at 363).
[Vol. 1999, No. I
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the discretion to submit a grievance.92 In contrast, argued Bodine, under the CBA at
issue, a worker was entitled to bring a grievance on his own.93 Upon examining the
CBA, the court did not find merit to this argument. The court found that the only
disputes employees were entitled to bring on their own were those between the
worker and union over the "handling of the system of referrals for work." 94 Any
other disputes had to be first taken to the union representative on the job site, who
then scheduled a meeting with a representative of management." The Seventh
Circuit was concerned with the level of discretion that was retained by the union.
It stated, "[w]e may not assume that [the union] will be highly sensitive to... the
interests protected by Title VII," which leads to the same "essential conflict...
between majority and minority rights."' ' The court held that Pryner applies to all
CBA's and does not distinguish between cases in which an employee can bring
grievances and those in which the union is responsible for instituting the process.97
Second, Bodine tried to distinguish this case from Pryner by claiming that
Johnson's complaint was basically centered around the CBA's layoff procedure, thus
requiring an interpretation of the CBA, a matter that should be submitted to the
CBA's grievance procedure.9" The court recognized that "[i]nterpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement is a question for the arbitrator, '99 however, the court
must first determine whether the claim is arbitrable, and that decision is left to the
court.1" Although there is a presumption favoring arbitrability,'0 ' workers cannot
be forced to arbitrate their Title VII discrimination claims.' °2 The court went further
and stated that Johnson's complaint was not with the layoff procedures in the CBA,
but, rather, that his layoff was the result of racially discriminatory reasons.'0 3 No
provision of the CBA at issue addressed racial discrimination. Thus, Johnson could
not be made to "arbitrate a matter that he [had] not agreed to arbitrate simply
because it touches on a CBA provision [lay-off provision].' °
Finally, the court noted that both Pryner and this case were not concerned with





96. Id. at 366 (quoting Pryner, 109 F.3d at 362).
97. Id.
We are not holding that workers' statutory rights are never arbitrable. They are arbitrable
if the worker consents to have them arbitrated. If the worker brings suit, the employer
suggests that their dispute be arbitrated, the worker agrees and the collective bargaining
agreement does not preclude such side agreements, there is nothing to prevent a binding
arbitration.
Id. (quoting Pryner, 109 F.3d at 363).
98. Id.
99. Id. (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599
(1960)).
100. Id. (citing AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986);
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 545 (1964)).
101. Id. (citing Nielson v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc., 66 F.3d 145, 148 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing
Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,24-25 (1983))).
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agreement to an arbitration clause in a CBA constitutes consent to arbitrate
individual workers' Title VII claims."' 5 Pryner answered this question in the
negative and the court noted that most circuits agree with this conclusion.' ° "Only
the Fourth Circuit has held that a CBA arbitration clause can bar an individual
worker's Title VII claims. '0 7
The court was careful to note that this opinion and Pryner were not meant to
suggest that arbitration is not a suitable forum for adjudication of Title VII claims.
Rather, they stand only for the proposition that an employee does not consent to
arbitration of his Title VII claims merely by being a party to a CBA that contains a
mandatory arbitration clause." 8 An employee will not be required to arbitrate
disputes he has not specifically agreed to arbitrate.'°9
V. COMMENT
The majority of federal courts and the decision in this case hold that workers are
not required to arbitrate their discrimination claims despite the presence of a
mandatory arbitration clause in a CBA. Only one circuit has sided with the minority
view and its interpretation of the law has been considered by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Wright11 The Court did not explicitly accept or reject the Fourth Circuit's
interpretation that an arbitration provision in a CBA requires union employees to
pursue arbitration. However, the Court did fird that Gilmer and Alexander are both
valid precedents; neither overruling the other."' The narrow opinion in Wright
merely held that waiver of a judicial forum for employment discrimination claims
had to be clear and unmistakable.' 2 The Court did not address whether this union-
negotiated waiver would be valid, thus leaving open the issue of whether statutory
rights should be arbitrated and whether rights to a judicial forum can be waived in
a CBA. 3 This issue is replete with competing policies opposing and favoring the
arbitration of statutory claims.
There are three main policy arguments which support the arbitration of statutory
claims. The first is a liberal policy favoring the use of arbitration in resolving
disputes. Most courts recognize the importance of encouraging the use of altemative
dispute resolution. The second policy argument advocates the use of arbitration in
the growing field of employment discrimination claims. Norris Case, in his article
105. Id.
106. See Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1453 (10th Cir.), vacated, 158 F.3d 1371
(10th Cir. 1998); Penny v. United Parcel Serv., 128 F.3d 408, 414 (6th Cir. 1997); Brisentine v. Stone
& Webster Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519, 526 (11 th Cir. 1997); Martin v. Dana Corp., No. 96-1746, 1997
WL 313054, at *8-9 (3d Cir. June 12, 1997), reversed, 135 F.3d 765 (3d Cir. 1997); Varner v. National
Super Markets, Inc., 94 F.3d 1209, 1213 (8th Cir. 1996).
107. Johnson, 142 F.3d at 367; see Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875
(4th Cir. 1996).
108. Johnson, 142 F.3d at 367.
109. Id. at 366.
110. 119 S.Ct. 391 (1998).
111. Id. at 396.
112. Id. at 397.
113. Id. at 395.
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on arbitration of employment discrimination claims, suggests that "[t]he expanding
employment discrimination docket may have triggered the courts' frustration with
litigation, and its inclination towards arbitration."'" 4 Finally, policy favors union
involvement in arbitration. Unions can provide assistance to their employees in
arbitration proceedings, help employees find attorneys to handle their claims and
insure that only worthy claims are submitted. "5
In holding that arbitration of statutory anti-discrimination claims is not required
under a CBA, the majority of courts have stood behind competing policy arguments,
many centering around the contractual nature of the CBA. First, under most CBA's,
the arbitrator is only able to resolve contractual rights stemming from the
employment, not statutory rights. Thus, an employee should be entitled to pursue
judicial remedies for these statutory claims.
Second, even though employees can bring suit, they are often unable to institute
an action and compel arbitration under the CBA on their own. Most agreements
require the employee to take his grievance to the union representative, who then
decides the propriety of bringing the claim. By allowing an employee to bring suit
for discrimination claims, he is able to act independently of the union when he feels
he has been wronged.
The third policy argument concentrates on the contractual nature of a CBA. By
joining a union, an employee becomes subject to a vast system of laws for which he
took no part in the negotiation. "The employee whose union negotiates a collective
bargaining agreement containing a prohibition on discrimination and a standard
grievance and arbitration provision is extremely unlikely to be aware, much less
agree, that the union has negotiated away his rights to litigate a statutory
discrimination claim."' 1 6 Once a CBA has been negotiated, it must be approved by
a majority of the workers in the union, however, it is binding upon all union
members." 7 Thus, a CBA represents majority rights."' Anti-discrimination statutes
protect the concerns and rights of minority workers. When an employee is
compelled to arbitrate statutory discrimination claims, a conflict arises between
majority and minority rights. Courts have recognized this conflict by ruling that an
employee is not required to arbitrate claims that he has not specifically agreed to
arbitrate. In Pryner, the court stated that "the union cannot consent for the employee
by signing a collective bargaining agreement that consigns the enforcement of
statutory rights to the union-controlled grievance and arbitration machinery created
by the agreement."1 19 If an employee agrees to arbitrate his statutory claims, then he
will be held to his agreement. However, he will not be made to arbitrate simply
because he joins a union and becomes a party to a CBA.
Finally, policies against arbitrating statutory claims focus on the purpose of non-
discrimination statutes. These statutes are meant to protect workers, especially those
incapable of protecting themselves. In her article on unions and employment
114. Norris Case, Arbitration of Workplace Discrimination Claims: Federal Law and Compulsory
Arbitration, TOURo L. REV. 839, 864 (1998).
115. Hodges, supra note 61, at 171.
116. Id. at 151.
117. Johnson, 142 F.3d at 365.
118. Id.
119. Pryner, 109 F.3d at 363.
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discrimination, Ann C. Hodges noted that, "[t]he purposes of the non-discrimination
statutes are not served by procedures and traps that make it more difficult for
employees, who are often unsophisticated, to enforce their rights.""0
Johnson and the majority of federal courts rely heavily on those policies, which
do not support arbitration of statutory claims in the presence of mandatory
arbitration clauses. Recurring themes throughout many of these cases include the
inherent problems with the CBA, including employees unknowingly waiving their
rights to a judicial remedy, the inability of arbitrators to resolve statutory rights and
the inability of employees to compel arbitration on their own. It is these policies
which weighed heavily in determining that mandatory arbitration clauses do not
require the arbitration of statutory rights found in anti-discrimination laws.
Because many of the majority opinions focus on problems within CBA's, unions
and employers may try to use creative drafting in order to limit the opportunity of
employees to pursue judicial remedies. It is not unusual for unions to favor
arbitration procedures which are less expensive and more efficient than their judicial
counterpart. Some unions may attempt to draft a CBA which would authorize an
employee to bring grievances on their own and would allow an arbitrator to resolve
both statutory and contractual claims. As the Supreme Court said in Alexander,
"[w]here the collective bargaining agreement contains a non-discrimination clause
similar to Title VII, and where arbitral procedures are fair and regular, arbitration
may well produce a settlement satisfactory to both employer and employee." ''
Questions still remain and "[i]t is unclear. . . whether it is possible to draft a
collective-bargaining agreement that would effectively preclude a suit on a statutory
claim and make arbitration the exclusive remedy for the vindication of the
employee's rights." 22 When presented with these creatively drafted CBA's, some
circuits continue to note the conflicting interests of the union and employees and
state that, "the union cannot waive the employees' right to litigate their statutory
claims."
23
Regardless of the way future CBA's are drafted, litigation over the effect of
mandatory arbitration provisions on statutory claims will persist. Much of this
litigation stems from the conflicting precedent handed down by the United States
Supreme Court and the lower federal courts. Although the differing opinions can be
attributed to the unique factual situations presented in each case, the problems
associated with conflicting opinions will not disappear until a clear rule is set forth
by the Supreme Court.
The Johnson case makes it clear that although arbitration is not an unsuitable
forum for the resolution of Title VII claims, a worker does not waive his right to a
judicial forum for these claims merely by being a party to a CBA. The only way a
worker can waive his rights to a judicial forum for discrimination claims is if he
specifically agrees or contracts to arbitrate these claims.
The decision in the instant case and the rule followed by the majority of federal
courts is the correct way to handle the competing interests of mandatory arbitration
120. Hodges, supra note 61, at 173.
121. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 55.
122. Boiler & Petersen, supra note 63, at 86.
123. Id.
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clauses and statutory anti-discrimination claims. Due to the inherent conflict
between majority and minority rights, it is sensible to require arbitration of only
those issues that the employee individually agrees to arbitrate. Many employees will
not know or comprehend that their becoming a party to a CBA waives their right to
judicial resolution of statutory claims. An employee will be required to arbitrate
Title VII claims only by specific agreement. In the context of CBA's, where
workers have virtually no voice in their negotiation, the majority rule recognizes and
protects workers' rights. The minority rule, although it has been subjected to much
criticism, is not without merit. The rule focuses on the worker's choice to become
a member of the union and a party to the union's CBA. If the worker voluntarily
agrees to the mandatory arbitration clause in the CBA, he should be forced to
arbitrate. The minority rule is less protective of workers' rights than the majority
rule. Considering that the purpose behind many of the employment discrimination
statutes is to protect workers' rights, it is easy to understand why most federal courts
favor the majority rule.
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Alexander, no federal court has ruled that
arbitration is an unsuitable forum for resolution of employment discrimination
claims. The majority rule, however, necessarily means that more of these claims
will be resolved before a judge than before an arbitrator. Whether this result is
viewed as a positive or negative trend depends on one's perspective. Although
arbitration can be less expensive and more efficient than a lawsuit, it is also
inherently defective within the context of CBAs. Arbitrators will often not have the
authority to resolve statutory claims fully or provide the scope of remedies available
through the court system. Also, many employees will not be able to institute
arbitration on their own under a CBA, but under the majority rule, they can
independently seek judicial relief. Until these problems in the CBA are addressed
and corrected, most employees will pursue judicial relief and forego pursuing the
union-controlled grievance procedure outlined in the CBA.
VI. CONCLUSION
Short of an agreement to specifically arbitrate employment discrimination
claims, most jurisdictions hold that a worker cannot waive his right to a judicial
forum simply by joining a union and becoming a party to a CBA. Although there
is a universal federal policy favoring alternative dispute resolution, the United States
Supreme Court and the majority of federal appellate courts have ruled that this
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